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Abstract 
Communal land ownership is frequently considered a constraint on farm productivity 
as farmers endeavour to balance socio-cultural obligations with the demands of 
commercial agriculture. Recently, the Fiji Government has encouraged indigenous 
Fijians to take up profitable sugarcane growing using traditional practices of 
‘communal farming’. Using Stochastic Frontier Analysis, this study finds that under 
certain conditions, farm productivity and technical efficiency increased for farmers in 
these co-operative farming groups. It also finds that there were improvements among 
inexperienced farmers who resided in villages, previously the group at the highest risk 
of performing poorly. The realisation of these outcomes lies in the influence of a firm 
structure that allows the expression of cultural and traditional practices, rather than 
their suppression, while also consenting to the accumulation of economic wealth 
within a culturally acceptable framework. 
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Fijians to take up profitable sugarcane growing using traditional practices of 
‘communal farming’. Using Stochastic Frontier Analysis, this study finds that under 
certain conditions, farm productivity and technical efficiency increased for farmers in 
these co-operative farming groups. It also finds that there were improvements among 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic advancement of most developing countries is tied inextricably to the 
development of their agrarian industries. While the introduction of markets, 
infrastructure and institutional reform are essential factors in the evolution of 
commerical economic activity, low productivity persists in many instances. Moreover, 
the low productivity among peasant or village farmers is often attributed to cultural 
factors that inhibit individual enterprise and undermine the motivation to shift from a 
subsistence-based existence to one more focused on cash generating activities. In 
traditional agrarian societies, the transition from subsistence to a market economy 
often means that farmers are caught between the demands of commercial activity and 
the social responsibilities of custom and convention.  
Increasing the capacity of indigenous Fijians to participate in the commercial 
agricultural sector has been a focus of Fijian economic development strategies since the 
Spate Report (1959) and the Burns Report (1960). A key principle behind these efforts 
was independence from the village and individualisation of production. Both reports 
recommended that the way forward for Fijian economic prosperity and development 
of the rural economy was to establish a “community of independent farmers” free from 
the “burden of obligations” (Spate, 1959:9, 22). Underpinning their argument was the 
assumption that traditional society was an obstacle to change and the persistence of 
custom hindered cash-orientated activities.   
Critics of Fiji’s development policies in the three decades following the Spate Report 
basically made three observations. First, the majority of the large-scale, state-led 
development projects had fallen short of their objectives of developing sustainable 
centres of economic growth. Second, physical separation from village activities had not 
created communities of individual, commercially orientated farmers; at least not on the 
scale envisaged by Spate and Burns. Finally, customary practices persisted, in spite of 
efforts to create independence that overcame the influence of culture on economic 
activity.  
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The recent emergence of Fijian1 ‘group farming’ collectives or ‘management groups’ 
made up of new entrants to the sugar industry has generated much interest among 
Government policy makers and the sugar industry. The number of formal groups that 
have formed themselves into a legal entity is relatively low. Nonetheless, they join a 
much larger number of informal groups spread throughout the cane growing districts: 
some established recently and others that are now in the second generation of farmers. 
 For Fiji’s ailing sugar industry, this development may provide one solution to a 
complex array of problems associated with the restructuring of its producer base. It 
also has a historical foundation. Recent promotion of these structures as the ‘way 
forward’ for Fijian farming has received widespread publicity2. Formal groups are 
characterised by: (1) amalgamating lands into a single production unit; (2) centralising 
management decision-making; (3) co-ordinating and controlling farm inputs and 
labour; (4) pooling capital; and (5) incorporating traditional or cultural values/concepts 
such as solesolevaki (communal work).   
It is within this historical background and socio-cultural context that this paper 
examines the issue of communal land and economic development. In particular, this 
research poses the following question: Can farm structures overcome the socio-cultural 
constraints and improve the technical efficiency of communally owned farms? The 
remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of Fiji’s 
sugar industry. Section 3 outlines the theoretical framework and the basic properties of 
stochastic frontier analysis. Data sources and the empirical model are given in Section 
4. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes with policy 
recommendations. 
                                                     
1 This paper follows the common practice of using the term ‘Fijian’ to describe the ethnicity of Fijians who 
are members of the indigenous, Melanesian ethnic group and ‘Indo-Fijian’ for those of Indian descent.  
2 Fiji Development Bank (FDB, 2003:17-18) and the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB, 2003:5) profiled the 
Naleiwavuwavu Cane Development Scheme recently formed by the yavsa Naleiwavuwavu of Betoraurau , 
Sabeto. The success of the organisation has been attributed to the establishment of a ‘management group’ 
to administer funds received under the Farming Assistance Scheme and members working collectively 
under the traditional concept of solesolevaki.  
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2. FIJI’S SUGAR INDUSTRY  
Indigenous Fijian sugar cane growers have been minor players in Fiji’s sugar industry, 
making up 26 per cent of the total number of growers in 2003.  While land ownership 
lies almost exclusively with indigenous Fijians, the majority of sugar production has 
come from Indo-Fijian tenant growers that have 30-year agricultural leases 
administered by the Native Land Trust Board (NLTB).  The total number of leases to 
indigenous growers registered with the NLTB as of 2003 was 3,416. Between 1997 and 
2015, 4971 leases will expire, the majority of which are held by Indo-Fijian tenants. As 
leases expire, an increasing number of Fijian landowners are choosing to allocate the 
leases to members of their own land-owning mataqali unit.  
Fiji’s sugar industry is under immense strain as industry and political leaders attempt 
to formulate restructuring strategies to improve the efficiency of its 21,000 small-farm 
sugar suppliers and its ageing processing mills and transport system before the 
reduction of the preferential prices received from the European Union (EU) and their 
removal in 2008.  Under the 1975 Lome Convention (an agreement between the EU and 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries) Fiji and other African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) sugar producers have received preferential prices for a defined amount of sugar 
exported to the EU. By 2007 the preferential prices under the former Lome Convention 
(now the Cotonou Agreement) will be removed, placing significant pressure on the 
restructuring of the production, processing and transport sectors. Recommendations 
for the reform of the production sector include a major reduction in the number of 
producers along with an increase in the average farm size.  
Loans from financial institutions to sugarcane farmers have decreased significantly in 
recent years because of the uncertainty about the future of industry and the large 
number of bad debts written-off because farmers were unable to service their loans 
(FDB, 2003). Funds borrowed from outside the industry have been steadily declining 
since 1994 (Rao, 2003). Given the uncertainty about the future of the industry, credit 
criteria of financial institutions have become more stringent. The criteria include the 
requirement for agricultural leases to be registered under ALTA or NLTA, which are 
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administered by the NLTB3. As well, vakavanua or informal leases (i.e., leases not 
approved by the NLTB) on reserve land were made ineligible as security to access 
these sources of capital for indigenous farmers. Not surprisingly, the number of lease 
conversions has increased.  
The tightening of financial criteria for debt financing has also seen preference by 
financial institutions and government funding ministries in granting loans to those 
indigenous farmers who are members of formal management groups4.  The rationale 
for this lending policy is that membership of a group will improve farm management 
decision-making and the pooling of resources (capital items) will increase the 
likelihood of key farm management activities being carried out. Informal groups 
sharing tractors and pooling labour have been in existence for many years. On the 
other hand, formal groups (Trusts, Limited Liability Companies and other legal 
entities) have only emerged within the last five years. The total number of such entities 
is uncertain but may be as low as ten. 
3.  TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND STOCHASTIC FRONTIER ANALYSIS 
Stochastic frontier analysis of technical efficiency was independently proposed by 
Aigner et al. (1977), Battese and Corra (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). 
Underpinning the stochastic frontier approach was the idea that deviations from the 
frontier might not be entirely under the control of the agent. The stochastic frontier 
model specification for cross-sectional data can be expressed as follows:  
 
                                                     
3 Agricultural and Landlord Tenants Act (ALTA ), 1976, and Native Lands Trust Act (NLTA), which has 
been in place since the establishment of the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) in 1940. Under ALTA, 
tenants held 30-year leases with the NLTB and lease rent was fixed at 6 per cent of the unimproved capital 
value (UCV). Since the expiry of the ALTA leases in 1997, all land transactions are now administered by 
the NLTB under NLTA. Under NLTA, tenants have no right of renewal but all new leases will be for a 
‘rolling’ 5 to 10 year term (up to a maximum of 50 years) and can be offered on a sharecropping basis. Rent 
will be established by the NLTB to reflect the ‘market price’ (Lal et al., 2001:16).  
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Where Υi is the output of the i-th firm; Χi is a vector of inputs and β a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. This specification allows for a non-negative random 
component in the error term, ui, to generate a measure of technical efficiency. The 
random error, νi, accounts for measurement error and captures random variation in 
output due to factors beyond the control of firms, measurement error and statistical 
noise. The error term νi is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid) 
normal random variables  with mean zero and constant variance. The error 
term u
),0( 2vN σ
i captures firm-specific technical inefficiency in production5 specified by:  
(2) i iu z wiδ= +  
where is a (1 × m) vector of explanatory variables that may influence the efficiency of 
a firm; δ is (m × 1) vector of unknown coefficients, and  a random variable such that 
 is obtained by a non-negative truncation of 
iz
iw
iu
2( ,i uN z )δ σ  . Input variables can be 
included in Equations (1) and (2) as long as the technical efficiency effects are stochastic 
(Battese and Coelli, 1995).  The technical efficiency of production of the ith farmer in 
the data set, given the level of inputs, is defined by: 
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The measure of technical efficiency is based on the conditional expectation given by 
Equation (3), evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the 
4 While not all groups are referred to as ‘management groups’, this is the term being used to describe 
groups that have an informal arrangement to share equipment and formal groups that have adopted a 
centralised management system.  
5 Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980:23) argue that inefficiency is typically determined by factors that are 
associated with farm management practice, and therefore socio-economic factors are not necessary to 
include in efficiency analyses. In spite of this claim, many studies in the past decade have incorporated 
social factors (age, gender and education): see Battese, Malik and Gill (1996); (labour) see Battese and 
Tessema (1993); (extension) see Hasnah, Fleming and Coelli (2004); (family and social cohesion) see 
Audibert (1997); (management, organisational form, property rights) see Wilson, Hadley and Asby (2001), 
Mathijs and Vranken (2001) and Gavian and Ehui (1999); (environmental conditions) see Sherlund, Barrett 
and Adesina (2002); and farmers’ attitude toward technology (Amara et al. 1999). 
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model, where the expected maximum value of Yi is conditional on (Battese and 
Coelli, 1988). The measure of TE
0iu =
i must have a value between zero and one. Yi denotes 
the value of production in original units.  The technical efficiency of the firm is the ratio 
of its mean production, given its realised firm effect, to the corresponding mean 
production if the firm effect was zero. The corresponding mean technical efficiency of 
firms in the industry is defined by: 
 (4)  
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Given the specifications of the stochastic frontier model expressed in Equations (1) and 
(2), the stochastic frontier output for the ith farmer is the observed output divided by 
the technical efficiency, TEI, expressed as: 
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where Xi represents the vector of values of the functions of input variables in 
Equation(1). The condition that  in Equation (1) guarantees that all observations 
lie on or beneath the stochastic frontier. The parametisation from Battese and Corra 
(1977) and following Battese and Coelli (1995) replaces 
0iu ≥
2
vσ  and 2uσ  with  
and  where γ must lie between zero and one: γ of 0 indicates that 
deviations from the frontier are due entirely to noise, while γ of 1 indicates that all 
deviations are due to technical inefficiencies. Maximum-likelihood estimates for all 
parameters of the stochastic frontier and inefficiency model, defined by Equations (1) 
and (2), simultaneously obtained by using the programme, FRONTIER 4.1 
(Coelli,1996). This parametisation allows a search across this range to obtain a good 
starting value for γ, for use in an iterative maximisation process involving the Davidon-
Fletcher-Powell (DFP) algorithm (Coelli, 1996). The relative contribution of the 
inefficiency effects to the total variance terms as defined by Coelli et al. (1998:188):  
222
uv σσσ +=
)/( 222 uvu σσσγ +=
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The technical efficiency measure depends on the conditional expectations shown in 
Equation (3) where values are assessed at the maximum likelihood estimates of 
all parameters in this model and the expected maximum value of output depends on 
the error term,  (Coelli et al., 1998).  
iv u− i
0iu =
4. DATA SOURCES AND EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Data collection for this study utilised a mixture of focus groups and surveys.  A total of 
22 focus group meetings were carried out across randomly selected locations in the 
eight sugar mill districts of Fiji between May and September, 2003. Of the 235 people 
who attended these group meetings, 178 were registered sugarcane farmers. A survey 
was carried out with these registered growers to collect information from on the main 
decision-maker and family plus details on farm management practices, use of labour 
and farm inputs. A series of follow-up interviews with another 33 individuals were 
carried out with farmers who fell into specific groups of interest. A random, stratified 
sample was taken from the 3,600 registered indigenous Fijian growers across the eight 
Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) districts. The total number of effective respondents was 
169. 
This study applies the single-stage estimation model proposed by Battese and Coelli 
(1995). This model is expressed in Equations (1) and (2). Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) 
state that the analysis of productive efficiency should have at least two components, 
with both incorporated into a single-stage estimation process. The first component of 
the process estimates the efficiency with which producers allocate their inputs and 
output(s).  The second component concerns the exploration of exogenous variables, 
which are neither inputs to the production process nor outputs. For the initial 
estimation process to select variables that have a significant influence on sugar output, 
both the Cobb-Douglas and translog forms were used.   
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These can be expressed in logarithmic form as Equation (8) and Equation (9), 
respectively: 
(8)  ii
j
jiji uvXY −++= ∑
=
4
1
0 lnln ββ
(9)  ii
j k
kijijk
j
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where the subscripts i refer to the i-th farmer; ln denotes logarithms to base e; Υ 
represents the quantity of sugar harvested (tonnes); Χ1 is the area harvested in 
sugarcane (hectares) in 2003; Χ2 is a dummy variable for land quality (1=greater than 50 
percent of farm is classified as flat, 0=otherwise); Χ3 is the total number of labour hours, 
including family, group and hired, per year for crop maintenance and cultivation; Χ4 
represents capital in kilowatts (kW); and Χ5 is the amount of fertiliser applied 
(kilograms). The value of each νi is as defined above. 
The model for the technical efficiency effects in the stochastic frontier is defined by: 
(10) 0iu 1δ δ= + lnFC 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5i i i iD D D D5iδ δ δ δ+ + + +  
where lnFC1i is the proportion of the farm in planted to cane; D2i is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the farmer lives on the farm, zero otherwise; D3i is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the farmer owns a tractor, zero otherwise; D4i is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the farmer leases reserve land (including vakavanua), zero otherwise; and D5i is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the farmer is a member of a management group 
(formal and informal), zero otherwise.  
Functional Form 
The choice between the Cobb-Douglas or translog functional forms was made using a 
likelihood ratio (LR) test. Griffiths et al. (1993:455) defined the LR test as: 
(11) [ ])()(2 01 HLHLLR −=λ  
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where L(H1) and L(H0) are the maximised values of the log-likelihood functions under 
H1 and H0 respectively. Given that the null hypothesis is true, LRλ  has an approximate 
-distribution, where J is the number of restrictions under H2 )(Jχ 0.  H0 is rejected when 
, where is a chosen critical value from the -distribution. 2cLR χλ > 2cχ 2 )(Jχ
Testing the null hypothesis of the Cobb-Douglas production function against the 
general translog specification was done by setting the relevant parameters for squared 
and interactive terms in the translog form equal to zero. The resulting test statistic 
of 3.06 compared to a critical value of 7.04 indicated that we were unable to reject 
the null hypothesis of the Cobb-Douglas at a 5% level of significance. A Cobb-Douglas 
functional form was thus selected. Estimates of the stochastic frontier in this paper 
were also confirmed using a 'random coefficients approach', following Kalirajan and 
Obwona (1994), allowing for the possibility of non-neutral shifts in the production 
frontier. Estimated results varied little and all technical efficiency rankings remain 
unchanged. 
2
3χ =
Hypothesis Tests 
The following hypotheses are tested with generalised likelihood-ratio tests: 
1. H0: µ = 0, where the null hypothesis specifies that a simpler half-normal distribution 
is an adequate representation of the data, given the specifications of the generalised 
truncated-normal model. The inefficiency factor error term, ui, in the truncated-
normal distribution is obtained by truncating (at zero) the normal distribution with 
mean µ, and variance 2uσ . If u is pre-assigned to be zero, the distribution is semi-
normal.  
2. H0: γ  = δ0 = δ1 =….= δ5 = 0, where the null hypothesis specifies that technical 
inefficiency effects are absent. That is, there is no inefficiency in the industry. 
3. H0: )/( 222 uvu σσσγ +=  = 0, where the null hypothesis specifies that the inefficiency 
effects are not stochastic. 
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4.  H0: δ1 =….=δ5 = 0, where the null hypothesis specifies that farm-specific effects do not 
influence technical inefficiencies6.   
5. H0: δ0 = δ1 =…. =δ5 = 0, where the intercept and all coefficients are zero7  
Stochastic Production Function Variables 
Definitions for the five input variables and four dummy district variations in Table are 
the following. Sugarcane (1) is the total volume (metric tonnes) of sugarcane as 
recorded by FSC for 2003. This is not a measure of total yield, as a proportion of farms 
have ‘standing cane’ or non-harvested cane at the end of the season. However, this 
information was not available to be included in the analysis. Land (2) is the area 
harvested and includes plant crop area (in hectares) and ratoon area, normally 
classified into years 1, 2 and 3 plus years, recorded by FSC for 2003. This figure does 
not include non-productive land or land used for other crops. Land quality (6) is a 
binary variable indicating 1 for farms with greater than 50 percent of the total land area 
in flat land, zero otherwise8.  
Total labour (3) includes the total number of hours of family, hired and group labour 
applied to cultivation, planting, fertilising, manual or hand weeding, herbicide 
spraying and cleaning or dressing the crop prior to harvesting. Harvesting was not 
included in the labour calculation as the majority of farmers indicated that they hired 
substitute cane harvesters. The value of 1 shown as a minimum number of hours 
indicates the small number of farmers who did not carry out any crop maintenance or 
cultivation during the 2003 season, yet were able to harvest a crop.  
                                                     
6 Setting u to non-zero and z to zero in the technical efficiency model reduces the specification to the model 
proposed by Aigner et al. (1977).  
7 Restricting µ to zero and z to zero in the technical efficiency model reduces the specification to the model 
proposed by Stevenson (1980). 
8 At the time of the survey, information on land use categories and soil information was in the process of 
being digitised by the Land Resources section of MASLR. Without the precise location of the farms for 
each of the surveyed farmers it was difficult to utilise the available information held by MASLR to give a 
more detailed description of the land and soil classifications for each farmer.  
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Capital (4) includes a common value (kilowatts -kW) of the two most valuable capital 
items of most farmers: bullocks and tractors9. Conversion from horsepower (hp) to 
kilowatts (kW) for tractors is 1:0.745 and bullock draught power for ploughing is 
estimated at 0.52 kW per bullock. For example, one 30hp tractor equals 22.37 kW and 
two bullocks of approximately 250 kilograms in weight equals 2.08 kW (Singh and 
Partap, 1999).  
Table 1: Variables for Stochastic Frontier Production Function 
Variable 
  
Sample 
Min 
Sample 
 Max 
Sample 
 Mean 
Sample  
Std.dev 
1. Sugarcane (tonnes) 3.23 477.72 117.24 89.21 
2. Land (hectares) .20 12.00 2.92 1.88 
3. Labour (hrs per year) 1.00 2,701.08 542.25 443.34 
4. Capital (kilo watts) 2.08 41.01 16.52 12.52 
5. Fertiliser (kilograms) 0 7200 882.36 961.88 
6. Land quality (binary) 0 1 .473 .500 
7. District 1 0 1 .159 .367 
8. District 2 0 1 .289 .455 
9. District 3 0 1 .242 .429 
10. District 4 0 1 .278 .449 
     
Efficiency model variables     
11.Farm in cane (per cent) .0316 1 .474 .294 
12.Reside on farm (binary) 0 1 .520 .501 
13.Tractor ownership (binary) 0 1 .215 .412 
14.Reserve land (binary) 0 1 .496 .501 
15.Mgmt group member (binary) 0 1 .271 .445
 
The value for fertiliser (5) is derived from the number of bags that the farmer indicated 
was applied per hectare10. Although FSC has a record of the number of bags sold to 
each farmer, this data was not used. Selling bags of fertiliser to raise cash is not an 
uncommon practice and therefore farmers were asked about the amount that was 
actually applied. 
                                                     
9 The lack of accurate data on the monetary value of farmers’ assets (e.g. houses, vehicles, bullocks, 
tractor(s) and other farm implements) meant that a capital value could only be estimated from a common 
power factor between bullocks and tractors. 
10 Farmers usually answered in terms of bags per acre. This was recalculated to bags per hectare. 
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Variables 7 to 10 relate to the Mill districts. Each District 1 (7): Lautoka Mill; District 2 
(8): Rarawai Mill; District 3 (9): Labasa Mill; and District 4 (10): Penang Mill. This 
variable is a proxy for regional differences associated with climatic differences across 
the two main islands of Fiji and also the industry infrastructure systems support for the 
growers. Each of the mill districts is made up sectors. To avoid the ‘dummy variable 
trap’ not all of the sectors in the Mill districts included in the sample, were included in 
the analysis. 
Inefficiency Model Variables 
The proportion of farm land under cane (11) is calculated using the lease area 
registered with FSC for sugarcane production and the total area harvested. Residence 
of farmer (12) is a binary variable indicating 1= farmer lives on the farm and 
0=otherwise. “Otherwise” includes farmers who live in the village and village 
settlements. Tractor ownership (13) is a binary variable indicating 1=farmer owns 
tractor and 0=otherwise. Ownership includes outright ownership by an owner operator 
or part ownership as a member of a formal or informal group arrangement. Reserve 
land (14) is a binary variable indicating 1=whether the farmer leases reserve land or has 
a vakavanua arrangement or 0=otherwise. Information for this variable was derived 
from NLTB and FSC sources. Farmer responses were inconsistent and showed that the 
farmers’ knowledge of their lease arrangements was not always accurate.  
Management group (15) is a binary variable indicating 1=management group owns 
tractor and 0=otherwise. “Management group” included a formal trust or other entity 
as well as informal arrangements between farmers. 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the model (Equation 8and 10) were obtained using 
FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). The programme follows a three-step procedure. OLS 
estimates of the function are first obtained, followed by a two-phase grid search for 
values of γ between zero and one with β parameters (except β0) set to the OLS values 
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and adjustments made to the β0 and σ2 parameters. Finally, the best likelihood values 
selected in the grid search are used as starting values in an iterative procedure using 
the David-Fletcher-Powell ‘Quasi-Newton’ method to form maximum likelihood 
estimates at a point where the likelihood function obtains its global maximum.  
Hypothesis Tests 
The first null hypothesis (H0: µ = 0) specifies that a simpler half-normal distribution is 
an adequate representation of the data, given the specifications of the generalised 
truncated-normal model (Table 2). The test statistic of 9.48 leads to rejection of the H0. 
The second and third tests that technical inefficiency effects are absent (H0: γ  = δ0 = …. = 
δ5 = 0) and that the inefficiency effects are not stochastic (H0: )/( 222 uvu σσσγ +=  = 0) are 
both rejected. The traditional average response function is thus not an adequate 
representation of the agricultural production of Fijian indigenous sugarcane farmers. 
Test four (H0: δ1 =δ2…. = δp = 0) that farm-specific effects do not influence technical 
inefficiencies is rejected along with the final null hypothesis where the intercept and all 
coefficients are zero.  From the specifications of the stochastic frontier model 
(Equations 8 and 10), the LR test results show that the technical inefficiency effects are 
significant in defining the variation in productivity among Fiji’s indigenous sugarcane 
farmers. 
Table 2: Generalised likelihood ratio tests for parameter restrictions in the stochastic 
production frontier and technical efficiency models (Equations 8 and 10) 
Test Null Hypothesis λ  20.05χ * Decision 
     
1 H0: µ = 0 9.48 5.14 Reject H0
2 H0: γ  = δ0 = δ1 =…. = δ5 = 0 100.96 10.37 Reject H0
3 H0: )/( 222 uvu σσσγ +=  = 0 26.97 2.71 Reject H0
4 H0: δ1 =…. = δ5 = 0 18.43 5.14 Reject H0
5 H0: δ0 =δ1 =….= δ5 = 0 27.01 2.71 Reject H0
 * 20.05χ  is obtained from Kodde and Palm (1986:1246) 
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Results for the stochastic frontier model are shown in Table 3. All estimated input 
variables are significant at the 5 percent level, except for District 4. Input share 
coefficients sum to 0.371, with land quality and regional variation contributing 0.598.  
Table 3: Maximum-likelihood estimates for parameters of stochastic frontier and technical 
inefficiency models (Equations 8 and 10) 
Variable Parameter 
MLE 
Coefficient 
MLE 
T-ratio 
OLS 
Coefficient 
OLS 
T-ratio 
Stochastic frontier      
Constant β0 1.468(0.082)*** 17.837 1.209(0.125) 9.706
LnLand β1 0.301(0.024)*** 12.638 0.349(0.039) 8.863
Land quality β2 0.096(0.026)*** 3.663 0.137(0.043) 3.173
LnLabour β3 0.018(0.009)** 1.998 0.007(0.020) 0.344
LnCapital β4 0.038(0.011)*** 3.561 0.019(0.018) 1.069
LnFertiliser β5 0.013(0.004)*** 2.835 -0.001(0.008) -0.124
District 1 β6 0.164(0.080)** 2.056 0.333(0.143) 2.334
District 2 β7 0.132(0.073)** 1.818 0.292(0.134) 2.173
District 3 β8 0.143(0.077)** 1.855 0.271(0.138) 1.965
District 4 β9 0.063(0.070) 0.899 0.269(0.137) 1.963
   
Constant δ0 -1.244(0.783)* -1.589  
LnFarm in cane δ1 -0.139(0.063)** -2.215  
Residence δ2 -1.366(0.519)*** -2.630  
Tractor ownership δ3 -0.687(0.355)** -1.936  
Reserve land δ4 0.193(0.123)* 1.579  
Management δ5 -2.813(1.242)*** -2.265  
   
 σ2 0.680(0.244)*** 2.780 0.064 
 γ 0.991(0.004)*** 233.203  
Ln(likelihood)  48.179  -2.274
Mean efficiency 0.828  
Number of observations 169  
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. ***,**, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively and t-ratio is asymptotic. 
 
The most significant factors are land (β1) land quality (β2) and capital (β4)11. Land or 
area harvested is a highly significant factor in the production function. Land quality is 
                                                     
11 Chemical use (herbicides) was excluded from the production function because of its low significance in 
the inefficiency model. This result was somewhat surprising given the gains in yields that can be achieved 
with the proper application of herbicides.  
 Page 15  
also highly significant but this variable is an indication only of the slope of the land (i.e. 
farms with 50 percent of the planted area in flat land).  
Data on soil fertility or land use capability was not available. The results however are 
indicative of the influence that flat land has on productivity. Cultivation costs are 
reduced and the response rates from fertiliser applications are higher than for cane 
grown on steep or very steep farms. Capital is highly significant and this indicates that 
higher kilowatt (kW) capital reserves are a significant factor in farm production. 
Farms with higher reserves are those that have access to or own tractors. The output of 
sugarcane is highly dependent on weather patterns (temperature and rainfall 
distribution). These differences are captured in the four districts dummy variables in 
the production model. Regional variation in farmer support infrastructure is also 
captured in the district dummy variables. These include: the level of government 
assistance (e.g. agricultural ministry extension services); industry advisory services 
(e.g. sugar industry farm advisors) and financial assistance (FDB loans and other 
financial services that may have regional differences). 
Other district factors include the distance from the farms to the mills. District 4 (β9) is 
the Penang mill district and produced the lowest t-ratio (less than 0.9). A high 
proportion of the farms included in the survey were from two sectors within the 
Penang district (Ellington I and Ellington II). A high proportion of the growers in these 
sectors have vakavanua titles or leases to reserve lands and therefore do not have the 
degree of security over their land that allow them to borrow funds commercially. 
Growers in Ellington II sector are a considerable distance from the mill and therefore 
are more reliant on hired transport. These factors contribute to a moderate level of 
technical efficiency among the indigenous growers in the Penang mill sectors with 
around 84 percent of all of Penang’s surveyed farmers falling into the low to medium 
category (see following section).  
The results of the technical inefficiency model based on the asymptotic t-ratios show 
that residence (δ2) and membership of a management group (δ5) have a highly 
significant positive effect on technical efficiency (or a highly significant negative effect 
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on technical inefficiency). The percentage of farm under cane (δ1) and tractor 
ownership (δ3) are also significant at the 5% level. Reserve land (δ4) has a positive sign, 
which indicates a positive effect on technical inefficiency (that is an increase in 
technical inefficiency). Gamma (γ = 0.99) is highly significant and the mean efficiency of 
indigenous Fijian farmers is 82.8%.   
Taking each of these technical inefficiency variables in turn we find that residence is 
highly significant (t-ratio =–2.63), showing that farmers who live on the farm are more 
efficient than those who live in villages or settlements. Membership of a management 
group (either formal or informal) is also highly significant (t-ratio = -2.26). Group 
membership appears to provide a mechanism to overcome problems that an individual 
farmer may face. These include the pooling of resources to purchase expensive capital 
items such as tractors and the centralising of management decisions to improve the 
coordination and management of labour.  
The proportion of the farm planted to cane is significant  (t-ratio = -2.215), supporting 
the argument that farmers with greater investment in sugarcane are more likely to be 
better producers. Tractor ownership is less significant (t-ratio = -1.936) than the other 
variables but it does indicate that greater capital investment in machinery improves 
technical efficiency. Farmers with bullocks may well be able to farm profitably and 
sustainably on small blocks but the physical demands of manual ploughing is an issue 
for farmers who are, on average, close to 50 years old. Additionally, farmers with 
bullocks are more likely to be subjected to requests from family to donate their 
bullocks to village ceremonies.  
Reserve land is significant (at the 10 percent level, t-ratio=1.56) and its positive sign 
indicates that farmers with formal leases on reserve land (Class J) or informal 
arrangements on reserve land are less technically efficient. These lease arrangements 
can be problematic for farmers, particularly with the restrictions imposed when 
applying for financial loans. Lack of credit security (collateral) on vakavanua and Class J 
leases has caused increasing pressure from financial institutions and the Government 
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for landowners to convert to agricultural leases (Class A) that are under the 
administrative control of the NLTB.  
Farm Profiles by Efficiency Rankings 
The farm level efficiency measures from the frontier estimates, combined with the farm 
characteristics from the survey data, provides a profile of indigenous Fijian sugarcane 
farmers by efficiency ranking (Table 4). Following Kompas and Che (2004) these 
rankings are arbitrarily divided into ‘low’ (25 to 82 percent), ‘medium’ (82 to 92 
percent) and ‘high’ (93 percent and higher).  
Table 4: Summary characteristics of efficiency groups 
Average value of farm features Unit Efficiency of farm group 
Low  Low Medium High 
<25% to 81%  <25% to 81% 82% to 92% >93% 
Total output   60.3 114.1 199.7
Land area  ha 2.7 2.7 3.5
Yield – tonnes of sugarcane per hectare tsc/ha 24.5 43.2 61.6
Area of farm planted in sugarcane % 42.4 49.1 50.8
Area of ratoon cane replanted  % 5.6 17.5 24.9
Land quality (1=flat; 2=rolling; 3=steep)  1.5 1.4 1.7
Total annual labour hours per hectare hrs/ha 170.0 203.7 198.4
Chemical (herbicide) used by farmers   % 36.4 55.1 54.8
Fertiliser (kilograms) per hectare  kg/ha 312.2 259.2 318.4
Reserve or vakavanua lease  % 53.7 47.1 48.8
Tractor used (hired or borrowed) % 77.8 51.6 75.7
Tractor owned by farmer or group % 14.3 21.7 31.0
Age of farmer yrs 50.1 47.2 51.0
Farming experience  yrs 13.7 15.9 17.3
Contract with FSC yrs 14.2 13.9 15.1
School years  yrs 8.3 8.0 7.2
Cash crops  % 27.3 35.8 23.8
Reside on farm  % 42.9 53.6 61.9
Tertiary qualifications % 10.5 2.9 2.4
Trade or technical skills  % 29.8 17.1 21.4
Non-farm income  % 15.8 8.6 21.4
Member of land owning unit  % 80.4 74.3 68.3
Member of management group  % 17.5 20.3 18.4
 
 Page 18  
Caution has to be taken with the interpretation of the results, since the correspondence 
of the farm characteristics with high or low efficiency levels may be coincidental and 
not causal12. The results from the inefficiency model in Table 8 are more precise and 
should condition the overall conclusions gained from these profiles. A noticeable 
feature of Table 4, is not only the difference in area harvested between the high 
performers and the medium and low performers (an average of 23 percent) but also the 
higher total output and yield. Medium producers, on average, have yields 43 percent 
higher than low performers and the yields of high performers are 30 percent higher 
than those of medium performers. The proportion of land in cane is not noticeably 
different between the high and medium performers but the proportion of ratoon cane 
that has been replaced with plant cane is significant. Land quality, while significant in 
the efficiency model (Table 2), is not a significant qualitative characteristic of the 
efficiency groups. 
Note that land quality in the efficiency model is binary (1 = 50 percent or more of the 
farm on flat land; 0 = otherwise) whereas Table 3 is based on the three nominal FSC 
categories. These are: 1 = 50 percent or more of the farm on flat land; 2 = 50 percent or 
more of the farm on rolling land; 3 = 50 percent or more of the farm on steep land. The 
only noticeable point is that high performers are producing on slightly lower quality 
land.  
The total number of annual labour hours per hectare shows no significant difference 
between the three efficiency groups. This is confirmed from the estimates of the 
efficiency model. Use of chemicals for weed control was dropped from the efficiency 
model because of its low level of significance. However, the efficiency groupings show 
a marked increase in the use of chemicals by the medium and high performers in 
comparison to the low performers (an increase of 34 percent). Fertiliser application 
shows no significant difference between the groups.  
                                                     
12 Care must also be taken in the interpretation of the relative rankings of the farms and distribution of the 
efficiency measures. Neff et al. (1993) in a comparison of nonparametric and parametric models using 
panel data from Illinois grain farmers, points out that while stochastic models result in lower mean 
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Tractor use by the three groups shows no noticeable differences but tractor ownership 
is significantly higher among the high performers. Years of farming experience 
increases with the higher performers but there is no significance difference in the 
number of years of supplying sugarcane to FSC. The proportion of farmers who reside 
on their farms or in settlements increases with the improvement in technical efficiency.  
Farmers with tertiary qualifications are represented more among the low performers. 
While the overall number of farmers with tertiary qualifications is low, this result 
indicates that farmers with alternative skills are likely to seek off-farm employment. 
This interpretation is corroborated by the higher number of low efficiency farmers with 
trade or technical skills. Of interest, however, is the higher number of high performers 
with non-farm income (21.4 percent). 
In the efficiency model (Table 3), farming on reserve land (Class J leases) or with 
vakavanua arrangements showed a significant negative influence on technical efficiency 
(at the 5 percent level). This result is supported by the slightly higher number of 
farmers in the low efficiency group. The low number of farmers in the low efficiency 
group who own tractors is also corroborated by the results of the efficiency model.  
Results from the stochastic frontier and technical efficiency models indicate that galala 
farmers, residing on-farm or in settlements, and farmers who are members of a formal 
or informal group are more likely to have a higher level of technical efficiency. Farm 
residence improves technical efficiency by reducing the farmer’s obligation to be part 
of social and communal activities that would normally remove them from farm work 
for long periods of time. Living out of the village, however, does not lessen the 
expectation from the village for farmers to contribute to social activities, nor does it 
reduce the farmer’s willingness to contribute. The key factor appears to be that distance 
from the village allows farmers to be more selective in their contribution of time and 
material gifts.  
                                                                                                                                                           
efficiency measures in comparison to nonparametric models, the distribution of the efficiency ratios is 
concentrated at a higher level.   
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Residing out of the village or on the farm alone may increase technical efficiency, but it 
is difficult for the farmer (and family) to maintain without support. Planting a higher 
proportion of the farm in cane is dependent on the farmer having access to funding to 
finance the seasonal costs, and similarly, purchasing a tractor is highly dependent on 
access to capital. While membership of a group does not necessarily mean that farmers 
will own a tractor or have a higher proportion of their farm planted to sugarcane, the 
chance of it occurring, increases. 
Settlements or farming communities made up of one or more mataqali play an 
important role in providing a support structure. Farmers in a settlement in the Bulivou 
sector were adamant that distancing themselves from the village is an important step 
in developing an independent attitude. Determination to succeed among the farmers is 
high. Two Methodist churches have been built in the settlement and they have 
developed an effective support group among themselves. Contact with their village 
occurs infrequently and is restricted to significant social occasions. However, while 
living in settlements or on farms may free up the time of farmers it does not always 
improve farmers’ capacity to save and accumulate farm capital.  
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper indicates that traditional group membership may provide a mechanism to 
overcome problems that an individual farmer may face. In particular, increased 
technical efficiency was a result of centralising of management decisions to improve 
the coordination of farm inputs and management of labour. It also enables key farm 
management activities to be carried out on each of the farms with minimal input from 
the individual leaseholder, for example, fertiliser applications carried out mechanically 
by tractor and mechanical spreader. If a farmer lives in the village and their 
involvement in communal activities reduces their time spent on farm work, the effect 
on the farm is minimised. The amalgamation of leases into a contiguous single 
production unit increases the scale efficiencies, and enables the pooling of resources to 
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purchase expensive capital items such as tractors.  A single organisation also improves 
access to debt finance and lowers transaction and administrative costs.  
An additional, but less tangible benefit, is the cultural legitimacy that group 
membership carries. Incorporating cultural concepts (e.g. solesolevaki) in the 
organisation’s mode of practice improves its acceptability with the wider social unit. 
Farmers who belong to a group where the resources are collectively owned, seem to 
have greater acceptance. Farmers are also less constrained in refusing to give more 
than they are prepared to contribute if the asset is collectively owned.  
Formal groups also have several distinct advantages over informal arrangements. Most 
informal ‘co-operatives’ have been formed primarily to pool resources to purchase a 
tractor or another capital item that would be too expensive for an individual. Land 
leases are kept separate, membership is voluntary and there is no centralised 
management system. While effective as a mechanism to raise capital, they are subject to 
the problem of common ownership: that is, assets are open to abuse. A tractor with 
several drivers but no one with the responsibility of maintenance has a very limited 
useful life.  
While these organisations have shown the capacity to improve the technical efficiency 
of farmers and provide a mechanism for capital accumulation, their application outside 
of the sugar industry is not known. The sugarcane farming system lends itself 
favourably toward a centralised management system.  Crops with greater husbandry 
requirements (i.e. higher technical skills) are perhaps less likely to respond to a 
mechanised farming approach.  
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